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 2 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On November 8, 2016, after an “unprecedented” election,1 America elected a politically 
inexperienced billionaire TV star as its 45
th
 President.
2
 While political pundits grasp for answers 
as to how Donald Trump claimed his shocking victory,
3
 some argue that the answer is 
straightforward: restrictive voting regulations.
4
 Electing the first reality TV star is not the only 
fact about the 2016 election to make history; it was also the first presidential election in 50 years 
without the full protections of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“Voting Rights Act”).5  
The Voting Rights Act, passed on August 6, 1965, was designed to combat cumbersome 
voting regulations that effectively denied voting rights to African Americans.
6
 During the Jim 
Crow era
7, local and state governments enacted voting restrictions that “were facially neutral but 
practically discriminatory,” to prevent African American suffrage.8 One of the harshest tactics 
used in the South was the poll tax.
9
 As a prerequisite for voting, individuals were required to pay 
a fee, called a “poll tax.”10 That tactic suppressed minority votes because minority voters were 
                                                          
1
 Danielle Kurtzleben, The Most ‘Unprecedented’ Election Ever?: 65 Ways it Has Been, NPR (July 3, 2016), 
http://www.npr.org/2016/07/03/484214413/the-most-unprecedented-election-ever-65-ways-it-has-been. 
2
 Andrew Buncombe, President Donald Trump: Billionaire Reality TV Star Becomes the Most Powerful Person in 
the World, INDEP. (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-elections/donald-trump-
president-wins-latest-us-election-2016-what-happened-a7406586.html; Jeff Nesbit, Donald Trump Is the First True 
Reality TV President, TIME (Dec. 9, 2016), http://time.com/4596770/donald-trump-reality-tv/. 
3
 See Anthony J. Gaughan, Explaining Donald Trump’s Shock Election Win: Five Factors Behind America’s 
Staggering Decision, SCI. AM. (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/explaining-donald-trump-
s-shock-election-win/. 
4
 Alice Ollstein & Kira Lerner, Republicans Were Wildly Successful at Suppressing Voters in 2016, THINKPROGRESS (Nov. 
15, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org/2016-a-case-study-in-voter-suppression-258b5f90ddcd#.bq9swngr4. 
5
 Id. 
6
 Orville Vernon Burton, Tempering Society’s Looking Glass: Correcting Misconceptions About the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 and Securing American Democracy, 76 LA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2015). 
7
 Jim Crow laws segregated African Americans from white society. Jim Crow Laws, PBS, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/freedomriders/issues/jim-crow-laws (last visited Mar. 22, 2017). 
Those laws “represented a formal, codified system of racial apartheid that dominated the American South” from the 
1890s until the mid-1960s. Id. 
8
 Burton, supra note 6, at 10.  
9
 Id. at 14. 
10
 Id. at 14. 
 3 
disproportionately poor and could not afford the tax.
11
 Although “[t]he creation of the poll tax 
was justified as a means of preventing voter fraud,” fraud prevention was mere pretext to 
disenfranchise African Americans.
12
 Poll taxes, and other discriminatory voting regulations had a 
devastating effect on minority suffrage. As of 1912, 42 years after the Constitution was amended 
to grant African Americans the right to vote, tactics like the poll tax prevented all but four 
percent of African Americans from voting in the South.
13
 
The Voting Rights Act was exceptionally successful at enfranchising African 
Americans.
14
 For example, in Mississippi, “voter turnout among blacks increased from 6 percent 
in 1964 to 59 percent in 1969.”15 As such, the Act is considered “among the most far-reaching 
pieces of civil rights legislation in U.S. history.”16  
Recent changes to the Voting Rights Act present a renewed threat to unrestrained 
minority suffrage. In 2013, the Supreme Court “gutted” one of its core provisions.17 In Shelby 
County v. Holder, the Court declared unconstitutional the section of the Voting Rights Act that 
required states with a history of voter discrimination to receive preclearance from the federal 
government before enacting a change to its voting law.
18
   
In the wake of Shelby County new voting regulations have popped up across the country. 
One of the most popular forms of new restrictions include those that require voters to show a 
photo ID in order to vote, known as strict voter ID laws.
19
 In fact, just hours after the Shelby 
                                                          
11
 Id. 
12
 Id. at 14-15. 
13
 Id. at 9-10 (2015). 
14
 See Voting Rights Act, HIST. (2009), http://www.history.com/topics/black-history/voting-rights-act. 
15
 Id. 
16
 Id. 
17
 Richard L. Hasen, Opinion, Turning the Tide on Voting Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/02/opinion/campaign-stops/turning-the-tide-on-voting-rights.html?_r=0. 
18
 Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2619 (2013). 
19
 Sarah Childress, With Voting Rights Act Out, States Push Voter ID Laws, FRONTLINE (June 26, 2013), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/with-voting-rights-act-out-states-push-voter-id-laws/. 
 4 
County decision, some states that had been required to receive preclearance under the Voting 
Rights Act began taking steps toward implementing voter ID laws.
20
 Voting rights advocates 
argue that regulations which require voter ID “disproportionately affect poor and minority 
voters.”21 In response, proponents of voter ID laws echo an eerily similar justification to that of 
proponents of the poll tax: preventing voter fraud.
22
 Today, voter fraud is still “practically non-
existent.”23  
Political scholars ponder whether these new restrictive voting regulations implemented in 
the wake of Shelby County had an effect on the outcome of the 2016 presidential election. But, 
perhaps the more important question is whether such regulations are even legal. The answer to 
the latter question could have an enduring effect on the future of voting rights in America.  
This paper argues that strict voter ID laws are the poll tax of the 21
st
 century and should 
be nationally recognized as illegal. Because strict voter ID laws unlawfully disenfranchise 
minorities, Congress should amend the Voting Rights Act to prohibit strict voter ID laws and 
include a new federal preclearance formula to protect the right to vote. Section I of this paper 
discusses the necessity of the Voting Rights Act. It explains the climate of voting rights before 
the Voting Rights Act was passed and analyzes key provisions of the Act. Section II covers the 
Shelby County decision and discusses its effect on the right to vote. Section III argues that strict 
voter ID laws are unconstitutional, and that such laws violate federal statutory law. Finally, 
Section IV proposes a solution to protect minority voters from modern era discriminatory voting 
regulations: a new preclearance formula based on modern data.  
                                                          
20
 Id. 
21
 Kara Brandeisky et al., Everything That’s Happened Since Supreme Court Ruled on Voting Rights Act, 
PROPUBLICA (Nov. 4, 2014), https://www.propublica.org/article/voting-rights-by-state-map.  
22
 Christopher Ingraham, New Evidence That Voter ID Laws ‘Skew Democracy’ in Favor of White Republicans, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2016) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/02/04/new-evidence-that-voter-
id-laws-skew-democracy-in-favor-of-white-republicans/?utm_term=.fca32944ca71. 
23
 Id. 
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I. THE RISE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 
 
A. Minority Disenfranchisement before the Voting Rights Act  
 
President Lyndon B. Johnson eloquently stated in his “We Shall Overcome Speech,” the 
founders of our country knew that, “[t]he most basic right of all was the right to choose your own 
leaders.”24 President Johnson delivered his famous speech on March 15, 1965, in response to 
what is now known as “Bloody Sunday.”25 
After decades of struggle between those African Americans who simply sought to 
exercise their constitutional right and the white supremacists who sought to suppress those 
voices, racial and political tension peaked on March 7, 1965, “Bloody Sunday.” On that day 
hundreds of peaceful civil rights protestors were brutally attacked by Alabama state troopers as 
they attempted to march from Selma to Montgomery for voting rights.
26
 
The 15
th
 Amendment of the Constitution was intended to protect African Americans’ 
right to vote, but white supremacists in the Jim Crow South were “tragically effective” in 
denying African Americans that right.
27
 Following the ratification of the 15
th
 Amendment, 
southern states enacted facially neutral voting regulations to disenfranchise minority voters.
28
 
Those regulations included requiring literacy tests, poll taxes, and the use of separate ballot 
boxes. 
29
 “By 1912, the South had virtually disenfranchised African Americans.”30  
 
 
 
                                                          
24
 DONATHAN L. BROWN & MICHAEL L. CLEMONS, VOTING RIGHTS UNDER FIRE: THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE FOR 
PEOPLE OF COLOR 1 (Brian D. Behnken ed. 2015). 
25
Id.; Christopher Klein, Remembering Selma’s “Bloody Sunday,” HIST. (Mar. 6, 2015), 
http://www.history.com/news/selmas-bloody-sunday-50-years-ago. 
26
 Voting Rights Act, supra note 14.  
27
 Burton, supra note 6, at 16. 
28
 Id. at 3. 
29
 Id. 
30
 Id. at 9-10. 
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1. Poll Taxes 
 
The poll tax can be described as “one of the great symbols of Southern racism.”31 In fact, 
the practice was eventually determined to be so reprehensible that it received its very own 
constitutional ban.
32
  The poll tax successfully disenfranchised African Americans as a class 
because African Americans were disproportionately poor.
33
 Depending on the state, tax 
payments “ranged from $ 1.00 to $ 2.00 per year.”34 In Texas, the required payment was 
“equivalent to $15.48 in today's dollars.”35 To some minority laborers, that meant choosing 
between spending a day’s wage and not voting.36 To ensure that white voters were not 
disenfranchised, states created a series of loopholes to guarantee poor white voting while still 
suppressing African American votes.
37
 For example, the poll tax was “optional”; tax assessors 
were not required to solicit payment of the poll tax.
38
 The poll tax endured as an effective 
method of suppressing minority votes until it was banned in the 1960s.
39
 
2. “Voter Fraud” as Mere Pretext for Minority Discrimination 
 
During the Jim Crow era, poll tax proponents argued that the tax prevented voter fraud.
40
 
A.W. Terell, a lead advocate for poll taxes in Texas, claimed poll taxes would “protect the 
                                                          
31
 Bruce Ackerman & Jennifer Nou, Canonizing the Civil Rights Revolution: The People and the Poll Tax, 103 NW. 
U.L. REV. 63, 65 (2009). 
32
 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other 
election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative 
in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state by reason of failure to pay any poll tax 
or other tax.”). 
33
 Burton, supra note 6, at 14. 
34
 Atiba R. Ellis, The Cost of the Vote: Poll Taxes, Voter Identification Laws, and the Price of Democracy, 86 DENV. 
U.L. REV. 1023, 1041 (2009). 
35
 Burton, supra note 6, at 14. 
36
 Id. 
37
 Ellis, supra note 34, at 1041.  
38
 Id. 
39
 Id. at 1043. 
40
 Charles Postel, Why Voter ID Laws are Like a Poll Tax, POLITICO (Aug. 7, 2012, 12:26AM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2012/08/why-voter-id-laws-are-like-a-poll-tax-079416. 
 7 
citizen against machine politics, convention dictation, and corrupt methods at the polls .”41 
Terrell argued, “because casting a ballot costs nothing, votes are quite cheap and were frequently 
sold for a trifle." 
42
 Thus, Terrell maintained that “[f]orcing each voter to pay a poll tax 
supposedly increased the ‘value’ of the vote and made ‘political machines’ . . . buying the votes 
of poor African American and Latino voters more difficult.”43 Early reporting on the issue made 
it clear that “preventing fraud was a pretext for the true discriminatory purpose: to minimize the 
minority vote so to ensure the dominance of the Democratic Party in Texas.”44 Thus, proponents 
of harsh voting regulations in the Jim Cross South used voter fraud as mere pretext to maintain 
political dominance. 
The voter fraud rhetoric continued through the mid-1960s. Although white southerners 
“knew that the purpose of the poll tax was to disfranchise African Americans and other 
minorities, they continued to use the pretext of fraud to justify a poll tax.”45 During the Civil 
Rights Movement, it finally became clear to the federal government that only federal 
intervention could eliminate the “insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in 
certain parts of our country.”46  
In November 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson directed his White House aides and the 
Justice Department to design “a powerful and unprecedented measure to assure Negro voting 
rights.”47 President Johnson advised his Attorney General, Nicholas Katzenbach, a key author of 
the Act, that he wanted “[the] bill completely legal,” so as to withstand any constitutional 
                                                          
41
 Burton, supra note 6, at 14. 
42
 Id. 
43
 Id. 
44
 Writing for the Houston Daily Post in 1902, journalist and eventual Democratic Texas sentator, E.G. Senter, 
reported a “weighty reason” for Texas to adopt a poll tax was “that it means the elimination of the race issue in 
politics... With two strong parties in Texas today, the negro would hold the balance of power.” Id. at 15.  
45
 Id.  
46
 S.C. v. Katzenbach, 383 US 301, 309 (1966). 
47
 Nation: Enforcing the 15th, TIME (Mar. 26, 1965), 
http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,841744-1,00.html. 
 8 
challenges by Southern congressmen.
48
 Accordingly, drafters of the law considered only 
“reliable evidence of actual discrimination.”49 Katzenbach specifically explained the premise 
behind the bill “[was] that the coincidence of low electoral participation and the use of tests and 
devices results from racial discrimination in the administration of the tests and devices.”50 As 
such, the formula was “calculated to attack the most flagrant rights offenders.”51 On August 6, 
1965, Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act. 
B. The Key Provisions of the Voting Rights Act 
 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act broadly prohibits voting regulations that discriminate 
on “account of race or color.”52 Section 5 gives Section 2 teeth; it requires specially covered 
jurisdictions, as identified in Section 4(b), to receive federal preclearance before enacting a new 
voting regulation.
53
 According to the Section 4(b) formula, a state or political subdivision was 
required to receive preclearance from the federal government if, (1) it maintained on November 
1, 1964, a “test or device,” restricting the opportunity to register and vote, and (2) less than 50 
percent of persons of voting age voted in the presidential election of November 1964.
54
 In 1975 
the Voting Rights Act was broadened to cover “voting discrimination against members of 
language minority groups.”55 Before the preclearance formula was overruled, nine states were 
                                                          
48
 Id. 
49
 Oluoma Kas-Osoka, A New Preclearance Coverage Formula: Renewing the Promise of the Voting Rights Act, 47 
WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 151, 159 (2015) (quoting S.C. v. Katezenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 329 (1966)). 
50
 Nation: Enforcing the 15th, supra note 47.  
51
 Id. 
52
 The Voting Right Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110 (1965). 
53
 Id. 
54
 About Section 5 of The Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/crt/about-section-5-
voting-rights-act (last updated Aug. 8, 2015). 
55
 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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covered in their entirety: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South 
Carolina, Texas and Virginia.
56
 
Until 2013, Section 5 provided a federal check on states with a history of voting 
discrimination. It prevented such states from implementing voting procedure changes that would 
“lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise 
of the electoral franchise.”57 
Although the Voting Rights Act was only set to remain in place until 1970, Congress 
repeatedly approved of its renewal.
58
 The Voting Rights Act, including the original preclearance 
formula, remained in place for 48 years.
59
     
 
II. THE FALL OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 
 
A. The Ruling that Opened the Door to the Modern Era of Disenfranchisement 
  
On June 25, 2013, The Supreme Court issued an opinion that would jeopardize the 
unrestrained suffrage that African Americans had enjoyed for decades. In Shelby County v. 
Holder, Shelby County, Alabama challenged Section 4(b) and Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act 
as facially unconstitutional because those provisions required some, but not, all states to receive 
federal preclearance.
60
 The 5-4 majority held that the Section 4(b) preclearance formula was 
unconstitutional and could “no longer be used as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to 
preclearance” because it was based on outdated statistics and eradicated voting practices.61   
                                                          
56
 Jurisdictions Previously Covered by Section 5, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/crt/about-section-5-
voting-rights-act (last updated Aug. 6, 2015). 
57
 Beer v. United States, 425 US 130, 141 (1976). 
58
 About Section 5 of The Voting Rights Act, supra note 54. 
59
 Id. 
60
 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2622-23 (2013). 
61
 Id. at 2631. 
 10 
The Court reasoned that the Voting Rights Act “sharply departs” from the “fundamental 
principles of equal sovereignty” because the power to regulate elections is reserved to the 
States.
62
 The Voting Rights Act infringed upon state sovereignty by restricting nine states from 
making any changes to their voting laws without federal approval.
63
 At the time the Voting 
Rights Act was enacted, however, interference in state sovereignty was justified by “exceptional 
conditions.” 64 The Court maintained that the low rate of African Americans registered to vote in 
the South, and the “variety of requirements and tests [enacted by several States] specifically 
designed to prevent African Americans from voting” justified the 1965 coverage formula.65  The 
Court held that in the 50 years since the Voting Rights Act was enacted, however, “things have 
changed dramatically” and today, the racial disparity among voter registration and turnout no 
longer exists to justify for the coverage formula.
 66
 
Although, the Court invalidated the preclearance formula, it did not declare Section 5 
unconstitutional. In fact, the Court explicitly stated, “Congress may draft another formula based 
on current conditions.”67 As of today, however, no formula exists, and therefore, no states are 
required to receive preclearance. 
B. The Unfortunate Consequence of Shelby County  
 
In her Shelby County dissent, Justice Ginsberg cautioned, “[t]hrowing out preclearance 
when it has worked and is continuing to work to stop discriminatory changes is like throwing 
away your umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting wet.”68 Her warning was well 
warranted.  
                                                          
62
 Id. at 2623, 2624. 
63
 Id. at 2624. 
64
 Id. 
65
 Id. at 2624, 2627 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
66
 Id. at 2625, 2627-28. 
67
 Id. at 2631. 
68
 Id. at 2650 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
 11 
Within just 24 hours of the Shelby County decision, five of the nine states that had been 
required to receive preclearance under the Voting Rights Act had “already mov[ed] ahead with 
voter ID laws, some of which had already been rejected as discriminatory under the Voting 
Rights Act.”69 As of this writing, all nine of the states required to receive preclearance under 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act have enacted some form of voter ID law.
 70
 Four of those 
states now require voter ID as a prerequisite of voting, and the remaining five states now request 
IDs.
71
  
 1. The Emergence of Strict Voter ID Laws 
 Shelby County allows states with a history of voting discrimination to pass voter ID laws 
without receiving federal approval, but voter ID laws did exist before Shelby County. States that 
were not covered by Section 5 began to enact voter ID laws a few years before the Voting Rights 
Act was gutted. The first state to enact a voter ID law was South Dakota, in 2003.
 72
 Beginning in 
2006, Republican politicians began calling for voter ID laws as a means of preventing the threat 
of fraud. In 2006, Republican strategist, Karl Rove, warned of an “enormous and growing 
problem with elections in certain parts of America today.”73  
Although no state had ever required voter ID before 2003, today, 34 states have some 
degree of voter ID laws.
74
 Since Shelby County, it is has become that much easier for southern 
state to enact voter ID laws. 
                                                          
69
 Childress, supra note 19. 
70
 Jasmine C. Lee, How States Moved Toward Stricter Voter ID Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/11/03/us/elections/how-states-moved-toward-stricter-voter-id-
laws.html?_r=0. 
71
 Id.  
72
 Richard Sobel, The High Cost of ‘Free’ Photo Voter Identification Cards, INST. FOR RACE & JUST. 1, 6 (2014), 
https://today.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/FullReportVoterIDJune20141.pdf. 
73
 Id. at 7.  
74
 Voter Identification Requirements: Voter ID Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Mar. 28, 2017), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id.aspx. 
 12 
Voter ID laws are characterized as strict or non-strict. A strict ID law is one where 
“voters without acceptable identification must vote on a provisional ballot and also take steps 
after Election Day for it to be counted.”75 In other words, residents of states with a strict ID laws 
cannot vote on a regular ballot without presenting valid identification. 
2. Disparate Effect on Minority Voters 
To many Americans, producing ID before casting a vote is, at most, an inconvenience. 
Lawmakers in favor of voter ID laws argue that asking for an identification as a prerequisite to 
voting is reasonable because the same requirement exists for purchasing a plane ticket and full-
strength Sudafed.
76
 But eleven percent of United States citizens lack government-issued photo 
ID.
77
 For minorities, an ID requirement presents an especially high barrier to voting access.
78
 
“Mandating a government issued photo ID for federal elections . . . disproportionately burdens 
low-income voters and minorities.”79 About twenty-five percent of African American citizens do 
not have government-issued photo ID, compared to only eight percent of white citizens.
80
 
For individuals without the proper ID to vote, locating the documentation required to 
obtain government-issued ID can create an additional obstacle to voting access.
81
 For example, 
when Anthony Settles, an African American resident of Texas, sought to obtain a Texas photo 
ID in order to vote, he was unsuccessful because his name did not match his birth certificate.
82
 
                                                          
75
 Id. 
76
 See Sari Horwitz, Getting a Photo ID so You Can Vote is Easy. Unless You’re Poor, Black, Latino or Elderly., 
WASH. POST (May 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/getting-a-photo-id-so-you-can-
vote-is-easy-unless-youre-poor-black-latino-or-elderly/2016/05/23/8d5474ec-20f0-11e6-8690-
f14ca9de2972_story.html?utm_term=.10b5b20120fe 
77
 Oppose Voter ID Legislation: Fact Sheet, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/other/oppose-
voter-id-legislation-fact-sheet (last visited Apr. 17, 2017). 
78
 Horwitz, supra note 76.  
79
 Ari Berman, Voting Rights in the Age of Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2016). 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/22/opinion/voting-rights-in-the-age-of-trump.html 
80
 Oppose Voter ID Legislation: Fact Sheet, supra note 77. 
81
 See Horwitz, supra note 76.  
82
 Id. 
 13 
Settles’ mother changed Settles’ last name when she was married in 1964.83 Without the name-
change certificate, Settles would have to pay $250 for a court process that would establish his 
name change—a price that Settles was not willing to pay to vote.84 The story of Anthony Settles 
is not an anomaly. Nefertiti Helem, an African American senior citizen, was unable to vote in the 
2016 presidential election because she was unable to locate her birth certificate.
85
 Although 
Helem “presented her Social Security card, proof of residence, and Illinois State ID, the 
[Wisconsin] DMV staff said it would take them at least three weeks to find and verify her birth 
certificate.”86 Settles and Helem provide anecdotes of minorities on both ends of the country who 
have been disenfranchised because they lack proper documentation of their identity. 
 3. Empirical Evidence of Discriminatory Effect 
Because voter ID laws are a relatively recent phenomenon, little empirical evidence 
exists on the actual consequences of voter ID laws.
87
 Most of the existing studies have concluded 
that, despite the fact that minority voters disproportionately lack government-issued ID, the 
presence of voter ID laws have a minimal impact on overall voter turnout.
88
 But, much of the 
existing research on the topic analyzed elections that occurred before the strictest voter ID laws 
were enacted.
89
 A new study from researchers at the University of California San Diego is one of 
the first to analyze the interaction between race and presence of strict voter ID laws.
90
 
The University of California San Diego study explains that “[t]he key test is not whether 
                                                          
83
 Id. 
84
 Id. 
85
 Alice Miranda Ollstein, This Is How Hard It Is To Get A Voter ID In Wisconsin, THINKPROGESS (Apr 2, 2016) 
https://thinkprogress.org/this-is-how-hard-it-is-to-get-a-voter-id-in-wisconsin-8be821ef8a88. 
86
 Id. 
87
 Zoltan Hajnal et al., Voter Identification Laws and the Suppression of Minority Voters 3, 
http://pages.ucsd.edu/~zhajnal/page5/documents/voterIDhajnaletal.pdf. 
88
 Id. 
89
 Id. at 4. 
90
 Vann R. Newkirk II, How Voter ID Laws Discriminate, ATLANTIC (Feb. 17, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/how-voter-id-laws-discriminate-study/517218/. 
 14 
turnout is lower in strict voter ID states but instead whether the turnout gap between whites and 
non-whites is greater in strict voter ID states.”91 Accordingly, the study singled out states with 
strict voter ID laws.
92
 Using data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study,
93
 the 
University of California San Diego further singled out respondents “who self-identified as white, 
Black, Latino, Asian American, or indicated that they were multi-racial.”94  
Based on that data, the University of California San Diego model “reveal[ed] substantial 
drops in turnout for minorities under strict voter ID laws.”95 Specifically, the study concluded 
that “voter participation dropped an average of 4.7 percentage points among self-identified 
Hispanics, blacks, Asian-Americans and mixed race individuals in general elections.”96 
Additionally, the impact of strict voter ID disproportionately suppressed minority voter turnout 
in relation to white voter turnout.
97
 The predicted gap between Latino and white voters in general 
elections, “more than doubles from 4.9 points in states without strict ID laws to 13.5 points in 
states with strict photo ID laws.”98 Additionally, “That gap increased by 2.2 points for African 
Americans and by 5 points for Asian Americans.”99 The empirical evidence of discrimination 
provided by the novel University of California San Diego study proves the discriminatory effect 
of strict voter ID laws. 
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C. The Poll Tax of the 21
st
 Century: The Voter ID Law 
 
The 24
th
 Amendment prohibits Congress from conditioning the right to vote in federal 
elections on the payment of a “poll tax or other tax.”100 The Supreme Court has held that state 
and local governments are also constitutionally prohibited from charging a poll tax. Harper v. 
State Board of Elections held that a state poll tax is unconstitutional because “it makes the 
affluence of the voter . . . an electoral standard.”101At the 1964 ceremony celebrating the 
ratification of 24
th
 Amendment, President Johnson said, “There can be no one too poor to 
vote.”102 Unfortunately, that sentiment is no longer true today. 
Strict voter ID laws are poll tax of the 21
st
 century because they make the wealth a voter 
an electoral standard, because proponents of the law are motivated by the prospect of 
maintaining political dominance, and because voter fraud is used as pretext to suppress minority 
votes. 
1. Affluence as an Electoral Standard 
In most states, individuals must pay a fee to receive a state photo identification card.
103
 
Thus, in states that require a voter ID, individuals who do not have a valid ID, must pay a fee 
before they can vote. As such, the affluence of the voter bears on his or her ability to vote. In 
most states, a state identification card costs about $10.00 to $25.00.
104
 Controlling for inflation, 
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the price for a state identification card today is equivalent to the cost of poll taxes during the Jim 
Crow era.
105
  
The Harvard Law School Institute for Race and Justice researched the cost of obtaining a 
“free” ID to vote.106 That report found that even in states that offer “free” ID, “the expenses for 
documentation, travel, and waiting time are significant—especially for minority group and low-
income voters—typically ranging from about $75 to $175.”107 Further,  “When legal fees are 
added to these numbers, the costs range as high as $1,500.”108 Like the poll tax in the Jim Crow 
South, voter ID laws prevent individuals without sufficient funds from voting.  
2. Voter ID Laws Favor the Republican Party 
Republican lawmakers in favor of voter ID laws, like poll tax proponents in the Jim Crow 
South, are motivated by political gain.
109
 Voter ID laws disproportionately decrease Democratic 
voter turn out. The presence of strict voter ID laws decreases voter turnout among “strong 
liberals” by 7.9 percentage points.110 In contrast, strict voter ID laws actually increase “strong 
conservative” turnout by 4.8 percentage point.111 
Republican politicians admit leveraging voter ID laws for political advantage.
112
 For 
example, Florida’s former Republican Party chairman acknowledged that Florida’s voter ID law 
was designed to suppress Democratic votes.
113
 Additionally, during a federal trial on 
Wisconsin’s voter ID law, “a former Republican staffer testified that GOP senators were ‘giddy’ 
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about the idea that the state’s 2011 voter-ID law might keep Democrats, particularly minorities 
in Milwaukee, from voting and help them win at the polls.”114  
Such tactics appear to have benefitted the Republican Party in the 2016 presidential 
election.
115
 According to Wisconsin records, approximately 300,000 Wisconsin residents lacked 
the proper ID to vote in the 2016 presidential election.
116
 Donald Trump, the Republican 
candidate, won that state by fewer than 30,000 votes.
117
 
3. “Voter Fraud” as Mere Pretext for Minority Discrimination 
Just as in the days of the Jim Crow South, voter fraud is still practically non-existent, yet, 
Republican lawmakers repeatedly cite fraud prevention as the rationale for voter ID laws.
118
 The 
incident rate of in-person voter fraud, the type of alleged fraud that voter ID laws protect against, 
ranges between 0.0003 percent and 0.0025 percent.
119
 Meaning that it is more likely that an 
American “will be struck by lightening than that he will impersonate another voter at the 
polls.”120  
Minorities overwhelmingly vote democratic. Compared to Republicans, “Democrats hold 
an 80%-11% advantage among blacks.”121 Therefore, disenfranchising minorities benefits the 
Republican Party. In fact, the Former Republican Chair of Florida admitted that the voter fraud 
justification was a “marketing ploy” to benefit the Republican Party.122 As noted above, poll tax 
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proponents used the “fraud prevention” rationale as pretext for the same underlying motivation: 
“to minimize the minority vote so as to ensure” continued political dominance.123 
Because poll taxes have been prohibited for decades, and because voter ID laws are the 
modern embodiment of the poll tax, it would seem that voter ID laws are per se unlawful. The 
nuanced state of election law jurisprudence, however, does not provide for such a clear-cut 
approach to the validity of voter ID laws. 
 
III. THE ILLEGALITY OF THE STRICT VOTER ID LAW 
 
A. Are Voter ID Laws Constitutional? 
 
Over the last century, the Supreme Court has espoused a “dichotomy of approaches” to 
election law cases involving an individual’s eligibility to cast a vote.124 During the late-1960’s, 
the Court consistently “construed the right to vote in the context of voter eligibility as a 
fundamental right.”125 In Harper v. State Board of Elections, the Supreme Court maintained that 
the “the political franchise of voting” is a “fundamental political right.”126 As such, the Court 
reasoned that any law that infringes upon a citizen’s right to vote must be “meticulously 
scrutinized.”127 Therefore, in Harper, when the Court reviewed the constitutionality of Virginia’s 
poll tax, it applied strict scrutiny. As noted above, the Court held that the poll tax was 
unconstitutional because “a State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral 
standard.”128  
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Today, the appropriate standard of review is not as clear. In 1992, in Burdick v. Takushi, 
the Supreme Court held that only those laws that create a “severe” burden on the right to vote 
must be subjected to strict scrutiny review.
129
 The Court reasoned that “to subject every voting 
regulation to strict scrutiny and to require that the regulation be narrowly tailored to advance a 
compelling state interest . . . would tie the hands of States seeking to assure that elections are 
operated equitably and efficiently.”130 Inconsistent Supreme Court decisions have created a 
“confused and muddled” electoral law doctrine.131 
1. The Modern Approach to Reviewing Voter ID Laws 
 
 The Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of voter ID laws even before it 
overruled the preclearance formula of the Voting Rights Act. In Crawford v. Marion County 
Election Board, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Indiana’s 2005 voter ID law 
(“SEA 483”).132  
Indiana’s law required citizens who voted in person “to present photo identification 
issued by the government.”133 Indiana voters who lacked the proper photo ID could cast a 
provisional ballot which would be counted if the voter brought the proper photo ID to a 
designated government within 10 days or if the voter signed a statement attesting they cannot 
afford one.
134
  
Despite the fact that voter ID laws, like SEA 483, infringe upon an individual’s right to 
vote, when the Court reviewed SEA 483, it did not apply strict scrutiny, as required by 
Harper.
135
 Rather, the Court applied a balancing test. It stated that, when reviewing a 
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constitutional challenge to an election regulation, the Court should “weigh the asserted injury to 
the right to vote against the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the 
burden imposed by its rule.”136 
Those State interests included “deterring and detecting voter fraud.”137 Despite the fact 
that the record contained “no evidence of any such fraud actually occurring in Indiana at any 
time in its history,”138 and despite the fact that the Court acknowledged that partisan interests 
“played a significant role in the decision to enact SEA 483,” the Court concluded that “[t]he state 
interests identified as justifications for SEA 483 are both neutral and sufficiently strong” to 
uphold the statute.”139  
Crawford was mistakenly decided.
140
 The Supreme Court misconstrued Harper precedent 
from the outset of Crawford.
141
 It reasoned, “as Harper demonstrates, [the burden a state law 
imposes on the voter] must be justified by relevant and legitimate state interests sufficiently 
weighty to justify the limitation.”142 The phrase “relevant and legitimate state interests” does not 
appear in Harper, however.
143
 Therefore, Crawford erred when implied that Harper did not call 
for strict scrutiny review of laws that infringe upon the right to vote.
144
 Rather, Crawford 
suggested that Harper applied a standard of review closer to rational basis review.
145
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2. No Rational Basis for Discriminatory Law that “Protects” Against a Non-Existent 
Threat 
 
Even when analyzed under rational basis, the most relaxed standard of review, voter ID 
laws are unconstitutional. To satisfy rational basis review, a law must be rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest.
146
 Ordinarily, a statute is upheld under rational basis review, so long as 
the government “could rationally have decided that [the classification] might foster” a legitimate 
state purpose.
147
 But when the government argues that a law “prevents fraud” as mere pretext to 
suppress a particular group, the law does not even satisfy rational basis review.
148
  
In US Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, the Government used fraud as a justification 
for the Food Stamp Act; a statute that precluded households containing unrelated individuals 
from receiving federal food stamps.
149
 The Government claimed that “the challenged 
classification should . . . be upheld as rationally related to the clearly legitimate governmental 
interest in minimizing fraud in the administration of the food stamp program.”150 Despite the 
government’s claimed interest, the Court found that the Food Stamp Act “simply d[id] not 
operate so as rationally to further the prevention of fraud.”151 According to the Act’s legislative 
history, the Court found that the true purpose was “to prevent so-called ‘hippies’ and ‘hippie 
communes’ from participating in the food stamp program,” not fraud prevention.152 
Like the Food Stamp Act at issue in Moreno, voter ID laws are not rationally related to a 
legitimate government interest. Despite holding that “deterring and detecting fraud” is a 
sufficiently strong state interest in enacting voter ID laws, Crawford acknowledged that there 
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was not actually any evidence of fraud. In fact, “[v]oter fraud is . . . practically nonexistent.”153 
Additionally, voter ID laws only protect against a limited form of alleged voter fraud.
 154
  They 
do not protect against mail-in fraud, or fake registration forms, or buying votes, or ballot stuffing 
by election officials.
155
 Voter ID laws only protect against “people showing up at the polls 
pretending to be somebody else in order to each cast one incremental fake ballot.”156 This “slow, 
clunky” way of stealing votes rarely happens.157 More 135 million Americans voted in the 2016 
presidential election.
158
 Of those votes, there are only two documented instances of in-person 
voter fraud.
159
  
Furthermore, as discussed above, some Republican lawmakers have admitted that the 
purpose for voter ID laws is to dampen Democratic voter turnout. For example, in a 2013 
interview for Comedy Central’s “The Daily Show,” a North Carolina Republican Party county 
precinct chairman stated that North Carolina’s voter ID law would “kick the Democrats in the 
butt.”160 Additionally, as previously noted, Republican senators in Wisconsin were “giddy” about 
the idea that its voter ID law might “keep Democrats, particularly minorities in Milwaukee, from 
voting.”161 These statements reveal that, like the Food Stamp Act, the true motivation behind 
voter ID laws is not fraud prevention. Rather, republican politicians are motivated by a desire to 
prevent minorities from participating in the Democratic process. Alleging that voter ID laws 
                                                          
153
 Ingraham, supra note 22. 
154
 Justin Levitt, A Comprehensive Investigation of Voter Impersonation Finds 31 Credible Incidents out of One 
Billion Ballots Cast, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/08/06/a-
comprehensive-investigation-of-voter-impersonation-finds-31-credible-incidents-out-of-one-billion-ballots-
cast/?utm_term=.e6c739110a3a.  
155
 Id. 
156
 Id. 
157
 Id. 
158
 Philip Bump, There Have Been Just Four Documented Cases of Voter Fraud in the 2016 Election, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/12/01/0-000002-percent-of-all-the-ballots-
cast-in-the-2016-election-were-fraudulent/?utm_term=.f6fcae08c35f. 
159
 Id. 
160
 Wines, supra note 109. 
161
 Horwitz, supra note 76. 
 23 
“prevent fraud,” when there is little evidence of actual fraud, does not satisfy rational basis 
review under these circumstances.  
 3. Crawford Leaves Open the Opportunity for “As-Applied” Challenges 
 
Despite the improper standard applied by Crawford, the decision did “raise[] the issue of 
the burden created by voter ID requirements as a potential basis for future ‘as-applied’ 
challenges.”162 As such, despite upholding the constitutionality of the Indiana law, the Supreme 
Court may still declare a voter ID law unconstitutional “as applied to the particular facts that 
their case presents.”163 In order to declare the Indiana law facially unconstitutional, Crawford 
demanded stronger evidence that the strict voter ID law severely burdened an individual’s right 
to vote.
164
 Specifically, Crawford affirmed that “the evidence in the record is not sufficient to 
support a facial attack on the validity of the entire statute.”165 However, as noted above, the 
evidence that exists today,
166
 establishes that strict voter ID laws, as applied to minority voters, 
do severely burden the right to vote. Thus, strict voter ID laws should be declared 
unconstitutional even by Crawford’s standard.  
B. Strict Voter ID Laws Violate Section 2 of Voting Rights Act 
Even if the Supreme Court continues to apply a less than strict standard of review to voter 
ID laws and continues to recognize voter fraud as a legitimate state interest, strict voter ID laws 
violate what’s left of the Voting Rights Act. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is still the law of 
                                                          
162
 Sobel, supra note 72, at 6. 
163
 Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 AM. U.L. 
REV. 359, 360 (1998). 
164
 Crawford v. Marion Cty Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 198-99 (2008). 
165
 Id. at 189. 
166
 See supra Section II(B). 
 24 
the land. As such, states are prohibited from enacting voting regulations that discriminate on 
“account of race or color.”167 
1. You can go Too Far With a Voter ID Law 
On July 20, 2016, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals—considered the most conservative 
appeals court in the country—essentially ruled, “you can go too far with a voter ID law.”168 
Texas enacted its strict voter ID law, which required “individuals to present one of several forms 
of photo identification in order to vote,”169 just two hours after Shelby County invalidated the 
federal preclearance formula.
170
 In Veasey v. Abbott, the Fifth Circuit reviewed Texas’s strict 
voter ID law, en banc.
171
 The court held, 9-6, that Texas’s law violated Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act.
172
  
Because the Fifth Circuit could invalidate the law under Section 2, it declined to address 
the constitutionality of the law.
173
 Nevertheless, Veasey expressly rejected “the argument that 
Crawford mandates upholding [the law] simply because the State expressed legitimate 
justifications for passing the law.”174 Veasey specifically distinguished the amount of factual 
findings on the present record from the facial challenge presented in Crawford.
175
 That 
distinction further suggests that voter ID laws can be found unconstitutional on an “as-applied” 
basis. 
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To evaluate whether the Texas law violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the Fifth 
Circuit adopted “the two-part framework employed by the Fourth and Sixth Circuits.”176 The 
framework has two elements: 
[1] [T]he challenged standard, practice, or procedure must impose 
a discriminatory burden on members of a protected class, meaning 
that members of the protected class have less opportunity than 
other members of the electorate to participate in the political 
process and to elect representatives of their choice, [and] [2] [T]hat 
burden must in part be caused by or linked to social and historical 
conditions that have or currently produce discrimination against 
members of the protected class.
177
 
According to the first prong of the test, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s 
finding of  “a stark, racial disparity between those who possess or have access to [proper] ID, 
and those who do not.”178 The record established that the Texas voter ID law had “a 
discriminatory effect under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.”179 
The “copious evidence”180 in the record included an expert report that “Hispanic 
registered voters and Black registered voters were respectively 195% and 305% more likely 
than” white registered voters to lack the proper ID to vote.181 The expert concluded that the 
disparity was "statistically significant and highly unlikely to have arisen by chance."
182
 
Additionally, the evidence established that the Texas law “disproportionately impacts the poor, 
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who are disproportionately minorities.”183 Specifically, “21.4% of eligible voters earning less 
than $20,000 per year lack [proper voter] ID, compared to only 2.6% of voters earning between 
$100,000 and $150,000 per year.”184  
To determine whether the Texas law violated the second prong, the court considered 
several factors known as “the Gingles factors.” In a report accompanying the 1982 amendments 
to the Voting Rights Act, Congress set forth the Gingles factors to determine whether the 
discriminatory impact of a voting regulation “is a product of current or historical conditions of 
discrimination such that it violates Section 2.”185 In other words, the Gingles factors are used to 
determine causality. The Fifth Circuit determined that “the two-part framework and Gingles 
factors together serve as a sufficient and familiar way to limit courts' interference with ‘neutral’ 
election laws to those that truly have a discriminatory impact under Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act.”186 
The Gingles factors considered by the Fifth Circuit, included, but are not limited to: (1) 
history of official discrimination,
187
 (2) racially polarized voting,
188
 (3) effects of past 
discrimination,
189
 (4) responsiveness to minority needs,
190
 and (5) tenuousness of policies 
underlying the law.
191
 In accordance with that framework, the Fifth Circuit affirmed “that [the 
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Texas law] worked in concert with Texas's legacy of state-sponsored discrimination to bring 
about this disproportionate result.”192  
Veasey concluded that the law violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, in part, 
because the “drafters and proponents of [the Texas law] were aware of the likely 
disproportionate effect of the law on minorities, and that they nonetheless passed the bill without 
adopting a number of proposed ameliorative measures that might have lessened this impact.”193 
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit instructed the lower court to come up with a remedy that would 
“disrupt[] voter identification rules for the 2016 election season as little as possible, yet 
eliminate[] the Section 2 discriminatory effect violation.”194 
2. Using Veasey v. Abbott Framework to Invalidate Strict Voter ID Laws 
Veasey establishes that the Voting Rights Act still protects against voting regulations that 
disenfranchise minority voters when there is sufficient evidence of actual discriminatory effect. 
Strict voter ID laws enacted across the country fail the two-part framework adopted in Veasey. 
Empirical evidence proves that strict voter ID laws disproportionately effect minority voters. 
Nationally, minorities disproportionately lack government-issued identification.
195
 Strict voter ID 
laws, therefore, have a discriminatory effect under the first prong of the Veasey framework.
196
  
Additionally, under the second prong of the Veasey framework, the discriminatory effect 
of strict voter ID laws are linked to historical conditions or current conditions that produce 
discrimination. For example, many states that have enacted strict voter ID laws, have a history of 
past discrimination, and/or are plagued by the effects of past discrimination.
197
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Furthermore, discriminatory impact may be linked to the discriminatory conditions even 
in states that do not have a history of discrimination. As noted above, one Gingles factor to be 
considered under the second prong of the Veasey framework is the “tenuousness of policies 
underlying the law.” Veasey explained, “a tenuous fit between the expressed policy and the 
provisions of the law bolsters the conclusion that minorities are not able to equally participate in 
the political process.”198 Veasey instructed that simply articulating a legitimate interest “is not a 
magic incantation a state can utter to avoid a finding of disparate impact.”199 The policy of 
requiring ID to vote is only tenuously related to preventing voter fraud.
 200
 Voter fraud is 
practically non-existent, and voter ID laws only protect against narrow form of voter fraud.
201
 
These facts “bolsters the conclusion” that minorities are disparately impacted by voter ID 
laws.
202
 
Under the Veasey two-part framework, all strict voter ID laws violate Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act. Therefore, even if the Supreme Court refuses to declare strict voter ID laws 
unconstitutional, such laws should be nationally prohibited because they are contrary to federal 
law.  
VI. A NEW PRECLEARANCE FORMULA 
A. Justification for Voting Rights Act Amendment 
The prevalence of unlawful strict voter ID laws, enacted with ease since Shelby County, 
demonstrates the need for federal preclearance. Although Shelby County declared the previous 
preclearance formula unconstitutional because it is based on “decades-old data and eradicated 
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practices,” it did not overrule the Section 5 preclearance requirement.203 In fact, Shelby County 
acknowledged, “voting discrimination still exists.”204 Strict voter ID laws confirm that fact. 
Therefore, Congress should enact a new preclearance formula based on data regarding current 
voter discrimination. Additionally, for the reasons stated above, any amendment made to the 
Voting Rights Act should include a national prohibition on strict voter ID laws. 
B. The Original Section 4(b) Formula as a Model 
As Congress drafts a new preclearance formula, it should use the strategy employed by 
the original drafters of the Voting Rights Act: it should calculate a formula to “attack the most 
flagrant rights offenders” and, in doing so, it should ensure that the formula is completely lawful 
by referencing reliable evidence of actual discrimination.
205
 To target states with the most 
obvious incidents of voting discrimination, Congress should retain the two-part test structure 
utilized in the original Section 4(b) formula (“the original formula”). 
1. First Prong of the New Preclearance Formula 
Just as the first prong of the original formula targeted states that employed a restrictive 
“test or device,” the first prong of the new formula should flag states that exhibit signs of 
discriminatory voting practices. Initially, Congress must come up with a method of identifying 
such states 
For the aforementioned reasons, the presence of a voter ID law in a state suggests that 
state is engaged in discriminatory voting practices. Therefore, states that have introduced or 
maintained a strict voter ID law should be flagged as potentially discriminating against minority 
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voters. Those states include: Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Mississippi, North Carolina, 
Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
206
  
Although this paper has focused on voter ID laws, such tactic is not the only 
discriminatory voting practice that exists today. Therefore, states that have committed a “voting 
rights violation” should also be flagged. Congressmen in favor of a new preclearance formula 
define a “voting rights violation” as one that “occurs when in a final judgment which has not 
been reversed on appeal, any court of the United States determines a denial or abridgement of 
any right of any citizen to vote occurred.”207 Congress should narrow its results to some non-
arbitrary period of time. Perhaps Congress should target states that have committed a voting right 
violation between the 2012 and 2016 presidential election, or since the 2013 Shelby County 
decision. 
2. Second Prong of the New Preclearance Formula 
The second prong of the new formula should sort out which states targeted under the first 
prong actually depressed minority voter turnout. Only those states whose laws disparately 
effected minority voters should be required to receive federal preclearance. 
The second prong of the original formula limited federal preclearance coverage to those 
states that maintained a “test or device” and had less than fifty percent of their total voting age 
population vote in the 1964 election. Today, aggregate voter turnout rates may not be the most 
precise measure of discriminatory impact. The University of California San Diego study reported 
that the most important factor to consider in determining whether a voting regulation had a 
discriminatory effect is not the state’s overall voter turn out rate, but rather the turnout gap 
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between white and minority voters.
208
 Therefore, the second prong of the new formula should 
sort out those states whose suspect voting regulation increased the gap between white and 
minority voter turnout. Exactly what amount of increase establishes discriminatory effect is yet 
to be determined. 
As noted above, the presence of strict voter ID laws increased the gap between white and 
African American voters by 2.2 percent.
209
 The University of California San Diego study did not 
provide results on how strict voter ID laws effected the gap between white voters and all 
minorities. Congress should direct further research into the effect of strict voter ID laws on the 
gap between white voters and all voters who identify as a member of a minority class. 
Additionally, Congress should research at what point the increase in turnout gap is so statistically 
significant that it is highly unlikely to have arisen by chance. That figure could represent the 
threshold amount used in the new federal preclearance formula. In other words, under the second 
prong of the new formula, Congress could require states, whose turnout gap between white and 
minority voters increased by that statistically significant amount, to receive federal preclearance. 
According to formula outlined above, states would be required to receive federal 
preclearance if (1) they have employed a strict voter ID law or committed some other voting 
rights violation, and if (2) that violation had a discriminatory effect such that it increased the 
voter turnout gap between white and minority voters by some threshold yet to be determined.  
CONCLUSION 
While there is no way to know if the existence of strict voter ID laws actually propelled 
Donald Trump to claim his shocking victory, there is no question that such laws are illegal. 
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Modern data proves that voter ID laws disproportionately restrain minority suffrage. 
Accordingly, strict voter ID laws represent constitutional and statutory violations.  
Although Shelby County dissolved valuable protections afforded by the Voting Rights 
Act, it preserved and emphasized Congress’s power to protect against unlawful discriminatory 
voting practices. By amending the Voting Rights Act, to prohibit strict voter ID laws and declare 
a new federal preclearance formula, Congress has the power to end the modern era of 
disenfranchisement. 
